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I. Introduction 
The book and movie Moneyball1 portray the iconoclastic 
general manager of a baseball team. When searching for new 
players, this GM deemphasized the insights of baseball scouts as 
on-the-scene evaluators of a player’s talents, and looked instead 
to statistical measures of player quality. By using such an 
atypical evaluation technique, the small-market (and low-budget) 
team was able to identify high-quality players who escaped the 
attention of other teams.2 
We take this idea from baseball into the criminal courts. In 
this Article, we pose the question whether criminal defense 
organizations—either public defender offices or private firms—
could meaningfully evaluate the skills of their attorneys through 
the use of metrics, rather than relying so heavily on the in-person 
observation of their work in the courtroom. In particular, could 
managers of criminal defense attorneys assemble performance 
statistics about their lawyers—numbers that would help them 
evaluate the attorneys and improve their work?3  
                                                                                                     
 1. MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME 
(2003); Moneyball (Sony Pictures 2011). 
 2. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Patrick J. Lamb, If Legal Services Value Stats Were Created, 
Standardized, Law Clients Could Play Moneyball, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 29, 2011, 9:30 
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/legal_services_value_stats_ 
moneyball/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Paul Lippe, Can Moneyball Principles Be Applied to the Valuation of 
Legal Services?, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 29, 2011, 8:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
legalrebels/article/can_moneyball_principles_be_applied_to_the_valuation_of_legal
_services/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Both articles discuss the possibility of using statistical analysis to 
evaluate lawyer performance. 
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The answer, we believe, is a qualified yes. The data available 
in most criminal systems make it possible to draw inferences 
about groups of attorneys; limits in the data, however, mean that 
a reliable, comprehensive rating of individual lawyers is not 
realistic at this point. That being said, a rankings system could 
offer a partial view of individual attorney quality. Numerical 
ratings might help managers identify some individual attorneys 
as proper candidates for closer in-person monitoring. If 
supervisors were to combine statistical ratings with other more 
individualized audits, they could learn something real and 
reliable about attorney quality. In short: Yes, it is possible to 
quantify some meaningful aspects of attorney performance, even 
in the midst of the messy and underfunded criminal justice 
systems in the states. Statistical performance-based rankings 
could support better leadership in defense attorney organizations.  
Rather than simply assert that a rating system is possible, 
we attempt in this paper to show its feasibility. We employ data 
from the North Carolina courts as a demonstration project to 
illustrate how an office might develop a rating system for the 
attorneys who work there. Like the Moneyball ratings that focus 
on a hitter’s run-producing results, our attorney ratings are based 
on the bottom line: sentencing reductions those attorneys achieve 
for their clients, principally through plea negotiations.  
Leaders of criminal defense organizations would not stop 
with a crude indicator of attorney success; they would want to 
know how to hire the best attorneys and create a work 
environment that makes success possible. We therefore use our 
tentative quality ratings to address the question of structural 
causes. What makes one attorney noticeably more or less effective 
than the typical defense lawyer? Is it the attorney’s education, or 
the amount or type of experience she brings to the job? Does race, 
gender, or age have any bearing? Do the attorney’s roots in the 
local community have any impact? Does the attorney’s practice 
environment, such as the size or type of law office where she 
practices, make a difference? How about the volume of cases that 
she handles?  
We show here that it is possible to identify some likely causes 
of defense attorney success. Our most surprising discovery is that 
experience actually has a negative correlation with performance 
after the first five years: the more time an attorney has spent in 
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the profession, the more likely that her clients will obtain a more 
severe sentence. This finding remains in place even after 
controlling for the seriousness of the charges and caseloads of the 
attorneys.  
In Part II of this Article, we note the widespread need for 
careful evaluation of defense attorney quality and the limited 
tools now available to make that assessment. In Part III we 
explain that any evaluation of criminal defense attorneys is 
challenging because these lawyers provide a complex service in a 
data-poor environment. We also note the efforts in other 
industries—ranging from sports to education to health care—to 
use performance statistics as part of an evaluation of complex 
work. In Part IV, we describe the history of efforts to measure 
attorney quality through court system statistics and introduce 
our strategy for measuring attorney quality based on North 
Carolina data. The rating system that we construct here produces 
a customized ranking report for a manager of criminal defense 
attorneys. That report quantifies how much a given attorney 
affected the sentences for his or her clients, as compared to other 
attorneys in similar cases. The ranking report also tells the 
manager the margin of error that attaches to the score for each 
attorney.  
In Part V, we look more closely at the experience and work 
environment of a subset of North Carolina attorneys in a 
tentative effort to explain the causes of attorney success. Finally, 
in Part VI we close with some reflections on other potential users 
of our statistical rating system, concluding that managers of 
defense organizations are better situated than judges, 
prosecutors, or clients to make wise use of comparative ratings.  
II. Evaluation by Guesswork 
Criminal defense attorneys hold in their hands the liberty, 
the livelihood, and the very lives of their clients. Any professional 
who provides services this important must expect to be watched, 
evaluated, and even second-guessed. Evaluations of defense 
lawyers do indeed happen from time to time in the criminal 
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justice system in this country.4 That evaluation comes from 
several different players—both inside and outside the system—
including judges, prosecutors, potential clients, and managers of 
defense lawyer organizations.  
Unfortunately, in the typical state court environment, these 
evaluators do not have the materials they need.5 Judges applying 
the constitutional standards for availability and effectiveness of 
counsel only ask in gross terms if an attorney is present at all, 
and if that attorney shows the clearest signs of substandard 
performance. Judges who appoint defense counsel rely on ad hoc 
impressions of the quality of attorney performance. Managers of 
defense lawyer organizations have access to more information 
about attorney performance, but much of that information goes to 
waste. And worst of all, potential clients operate almost entirely 
in the dark about the quality of defense lawyers.  
All of these actors find themselves compelled to evaluate 
criminal defense lawyers, yet they do not find the tools at hand to 
do the job well. They evaluate by guesswork. 
A. Guesswork by Courtroom Professionals 
Judges evaluate the work of counsel in at least two settings: 
when they apply constitutional minimum standards of 
availability and quality, and when they appoint attorneys for 
indigent defendants.6 In both settings, judges operate on the 
basis of extremely thin information.  
The Gideon v. Wainwright7 standard determines whether the 
government has met its obligation to make defense counsel 
available. In its traditional form, Gideon asks a binary question: 
is a lawyer present during a proceeding when the Constitution 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Adele Bernhard, Raising the Bar: Standards-Based Training, 
Supervision, and Evaluation, 75 MO. L. REV. 831, 845–51 (2010) (describing 
methods for evaluation defense counsel performance). 
 5. See id. at 848 (“[L]ack of oversight is consistently cited as one of the 
structural defects in indigent defense systems.”). 
 6. See infra notes 7–8, 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Alabama v. 
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).  
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guarantees the assistance of counsel?8 In applying this standard, 
a judge needs no information about the individual skills of the 
attorney. Although the information available to the judge is thin, 
the traditional doctrine requires no effort to compare one 
attorney to another, or to compare an attorney to an abstract 
standard of performance.9  
The availability standard of Gideon also takes a more 
innovative form, leading some courts to ask whether the limited 
funding and large workloads of defense lawyers create such an 
overcrowded environment that an attorney is not truly 
“available”; that is, competent lawyering usually does not happen 
in such an overburdened system.10 The judge in this setting does 
not inquire about the outputs of any single attorney, but hears 
evidence instead about the resource inputs that are available to 
entire groups of attorneys.  
The ineffective assistance of counsel cases, such as 
Strickland v. Washington,11 require the judge to assemble more 
evidence about an individual lawyer. In particular, the judge asks 
whether the attorney performed adequately and whether an 
                                                                                                     
 8. See United States v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he 
right [to counsel] is violated when states fail to appoint counsel for defendants 
who cannot afford representation.”) (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 
(2004)); State v. Wiley, 565 S.E.2d 22, 40 (N.C. 2002) (stating that total 
deprivation of the right to counsel is a structural error); State v. Anderson, 558 
S.E.2d 87, 92 (N.C. 2002); Justin Marceau & Nathan Rudolph, The Colorado 
Counsel Conundrum: Plea Bargaining, Misdemeanors, and the Right to Counsel, 
89 DENV. U. L. REV. 327, 338 (2011) (stating that the presence of counsel is 
required for all felony prosecutions and misdemeanor prosecutions that result in 
incarceration). 
 9. See Virginia E. Sloan et al., Gideon’s Unfulfilled Mandate: Time for a 
New Consensus, HUM. RTS., Winter 2004, at 3, 3 (explaining that Gideon does 
not require quality standards for public defenders). 
 10. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense 
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 428 (2009); Stephen F. 
Hanlon, State Constitutional Challenges to Indigent Defense Systems, 75 MO. L. 
REV. 751, 754–56 (2010); Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in 
Florida: Separation of Powers as a Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 
MO. L. REV. 885, 885 (2010); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense 
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 221–22  
(2004).  
 11. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Missouri v. 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
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inadequate performance prejudiced the client.12 But for reasons 
explored in detail elsewhere, the record about a lawyer’s 
performance can be minimal.13 The judge compares one lawyer’s 
activities to the presumed ordinary activities of a comparison pool 
of lawyers and completely ignores the results obtained for the 
defendant at bar or for any other clients of the defense attorney 
in question. The constitutional standard tries to prevent only the 
weakest performances, as measured by a cursory review of the 
attorney’s amount and type of activity, rather than the results 
achieved. It does so based on presumptions about activity levels, 
not data about results. As a method of improving the quality of 
the median performance for defense attorneys, the constitutional 
doctrine is a dead end.  
Judges sometimes make more nuanced judgments about the 
quality of defense lawyers when they appoint attorneys to 
represent indigent defendants.14 A judge might perform ad hoc 
evaluations of local attorneys, saving the more skillful lawyers for 
the most serious cases.15 It is also common for local rules of court 
to reserve serious felony trials for attorneys with second-chair 
experience in comparable cases.16 In short, the appointment 
decision rest on unquantifiable impressions of attorney quality 
(in ad hoc jurisdictions) or on crude measures of past experience 
(rules requiring a certain number of prior trials).17  
                                                                                                     
 12. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 13. See Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors 
that Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 263, 322 (2009) (explaining problems with demonstrating prejudice to the 
defendant when facts establishing innocence are left off the record due to 
attorney incompetence); Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to Counsel, 37 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 596, 606–07 (2011) (noting the difficulty of demonstrating 
ineffective assistance of counsel when few errors actually occur on the record).  
 14. See Bernhard, supra note 4, at 846–47 (describing qualification 
standards for appointed counsel). 
 15. See id. at 847 (“The more challenging or severe the class of crime, the 
more extensive experience the applicant must have in order to be assigned to 
the category of case.”). 
 16. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: 
CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 812 (4th ed. 2011) (reprinting the 
appointment rule from Cuyahoga County, Ohio).  
 17. Cf. Bernhard, supra note 4, at 847 (describing evaluation criteria based 
on prior experience). 
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These judgments, unlike the assessments that judges make 
under Gideon and Strickland, could improve if the judge had 
richer information available about the performance of individual 
attorneys. The judge guesses about the proper attorney to appoint 
based on such thin evidence because the evidence is expensive to 
develop, not because it is irrelevant.  
Just as the judge makes broad-brush evaluations of defense 
attorneys, prosecutors keep an eye on the quality of the defense 
lawyers they face. In rare cases, the arrival of a high-quality 
defense attorney in the case might convince the prosecutor to 
assign more office resources to that case.18 At the other extreme, 
prosecutors remain alert to cases in which an exceptionally weak 
defense lawyer represents the defendant.19 Although there is 
some variety of practice on this matter, at least some prosecutors 
feel bound to watch for grossly inadequate counsel and to take 
steps to protect the defendant’s rights in extreme cases if the 
defense lawyer does not perform the job.20 Again, the prosecutor’s 
evaluation of the defense counsel looks to the amount and type of 
attorney activity, not results. The prosecutor’s assessment only 
becomes relevant in the most extremely inadequate 
performances.  
B. Organizational and Client Guesswork 
The more thorough evaluations of defense lawyers come from 
within their own organizations, whether it be public defender 
offices or private law offices. The culture within a defense 
organization is ultimately more important than constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 18. See generally Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a 
“Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment” if You’re Trying to Put That 
Lawyer’s Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (2000). 
 19. See id. at 1039–44 (discussing the propriety of a prosecutor evaluating 
and commenting on the poor quality of defense counsel). 
 20. See, e.g., N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2006) (“A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice . . . . This responsibility 
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. 
Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of 
debate and varies in different jurisdictions.”). 
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doctrine or legal standards as a driver of quality legal 
representation.21  
The most important employers of criminal defense lawyers 
are public defender organizations, which are spreading to cover 
larger proportions of all criminal defendants.22 The organizations 
themselves are becoming larger and more bureaucratic, as 
individual offices grow larger and statewide supervision and 
funding builds network links among formerly separate local 
offices.23 This organizational growth both increases the capacity 
to collect information about attorneys and increases the value of 
analyzing data to improve overall performance.24  
In a world of thin resources for criminal defense—a world 
that Gideon institutionalized—managers in these offices need to 
evaluate the quality of their attorneys.25 If they identify weaker 
attorneys, the managers can offer the training and support 
needed to shore up trouble areas. An ability to spot the most 
talented and effective attorneys is important in choosing mid-
level leadership positions in the office, encouraging mentor 
relationships, and assigning the high-stakes cases that arrive in 
the office.  
While individual attorney evaluations are important within 
public defender organizations, the current basis for these 
evaluations is anecdotal and intuitive. Individual managers 
might receive episodic feedback from judges, clients, or even 
prosecutors about the quality of an attorney’s work. The 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Jonathan Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using 
Organizational Culture to Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177, 
181 (2009) (stressing the importance of organizational culture). 
 22.  DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL 
PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 4 (2010) (describing caseload of county 
public defender offices); CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 2 (2000) (comparing the number of federal 
criminal cases handled by panel attorneys and Federal Defender 
Organizations); LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., STATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, at 3 (2010). 
 23. See Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal 
Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515, 1524–27 (2011).  
 24. Cf. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 973 (1968) (listing reasons for 
the superiority of bureaucratic organization over other types of organizations). 
 25. See Bernhard, supra note 4, at 840–43  (noting the need for improved 
training, supervision, and evaluation of public defenders). 
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supervisor might observe a small sample of the attorney’s work, 
perhaps by sitting in on a trial or by auditing files in particularly 
important cases. 
Managers in public defense organizations do evaluate 
individual attorneys, but they typically do not rely on 
quantitative measures.26 When it comes to quantitative 
measures, these managers more often use data to evaluate 
defender offices as a whole, rather than relying on statistics to 
inform their assessment of particular staff attorneys.27 For 
instance, a few public defender services collect agency-wide 
statistics that track levels of attorney activity and early contact 
with clients, such as frequency of visitation with clients during 
the earliest phases of the representation.28 Organizations also 
find real value in weighing the caseloads assigned to each 
attorney and clocking the typical speed of case disposition. They 
use these metrics to build the political case for continued or 
increased funding.29  
The need for data-driven evaluation is less obvious for 
criminal defense attorneys who work for private law firms. A 
disproportionate number of criminal litigators work in solo 
practice or in small firms.30 They do not adopt the heavy 
                                                                                                     
 26. For a description of an evaluation process for individual attorneys in a 
defender organization, see JOHN S. DIGIACINTO, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 
2010–2011 TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS SAN MATEO COUNTY 39–44 (2011); see 
also Standards of Practice for Indigent Criminal Defense, VA. INDIGENT DEF. 
COMMISSION, http://www.indigentdefense.virginia.gov/StandofPracEnf.htm (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (listing standards of practice for public defenders) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 27. See FAROLE & LANGTON, supra note 22, at 3–6 (using statistics to 
evaluate public defender offices as a whole, rather than on the basis of 
individual attorneys). 
 28. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Assessing the Indigent Defense System 12–16 
(Sept. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Hashimoto%20Indigent%20Defense.pdf 
(providing statistics on the amount of contact between counsel and clients). 
 29. See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Qualitative Assessments of Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 571, 577–80 (2012) (describing public 
defenders’ use of quantitative measurements); Wright, supra note 10, at 236–41; 
Spangenberg Grp., Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable, https://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf (listing standards for excessive caseload). 
 30. Cf. Criminal Litigation Careers: The Private Defense Attorney, VAULT, 
http://www.vault.com/articles/Criminal-Litigation-Careers:-The-Private-Defense-
Attorney-22541018.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“Most criminal defense firms 
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monitoring practices that larger law firms use to track hours and 
the quality of work.31 Nor does there appear to be much demand 
among the leaders of smaller firms for better tools to monitor and 
evaluate the defense attorneys within the firm.32  
On the other hand, it is easy to imagine that clients would 
have a sharp interest in evaluating and comparing defense 
attorneys. And it seems clear that results in past cases would 
matter greatly to these potential future clients. Perhaps more 
than any other group, clients would benefit from some 
meaningful way to evaluate the quality of defense attorneys 
potentially available to them. Meanwhile, clients have the least 
access to meaningful information that would allow them to 
compare one attorney to another. Perhaps the client receives a 
recommendation from a friend, often based on a favorable 
experience of one previous client. Or perhaps the client draws 
conclusions about the attorney’s quality based on truly irrelevant 
clues. Whatever the source, clients enter the attorney–client 
relationship with information too feeble to support any weight at 
all.  
III. Evaluation in a Data-Impoverished Context 
If the need for better measures of attorney quality is clear 
enough, the way to get better measures is not so clear. In fact, 
there are barriers to meaningful, results-based evaluations of 
attorneys generally.33 Those challenges are especially pronounced 
for criminal defense attorneys.34 
                                                                                                     
are smaller than their corporate counterparts.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 31. See W. Keith Shannon & Russell J. White, TQM—Ready or Not, S.C. 
LAW., Jan.–Feb. 1994, at 11, 15 (“Many lawyers in solo and small firm practices 
tend to dismiss the idea of [quality analysis] as being designed for use only in 
larger firms.”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See William H. Simon, Where Is the “Quality Movement” in Law 
Practice?, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 387, 402–03 (describing how professional culture 
makes attorneys reluctant to be evaluated based on performance). 
 34. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1461, 1487–88 (2003) (discussing a lack of information exchange 
between defense attorneys and clients). 
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Lawyers provide a complex service, offering a blend of legal 
and practical advice to clients who present an infinite variety of 
problems.35 The bottom line of a “win” or a “loss” is difficult to 
define, and does not begin to tell the full story of how an attorney 
could add value for a given client.36  
In many jurisdictions, the ethics rules embody this reluctance 
to measure attorney quality by results. For instance, the rules 
related to advertising for clients build on the assumption that any 
“guarantee” of results would be misleading.37 Client testimonials 
about favorable outcomes in past cases are also suspect and must 
include a disclaimer that past outcomes do not guarantee future 
results.38 Even direct comparisons of one lawyer’s skills to 
another’s raise concerns for bar enforcers, who insist that such 
advertisements base their comparisons on verifiable facts.39  
While the complexity of legal services presents a challenge to 
rating lawyers in many subject areas, an additional problem 
appears in the criminal context. Criminal courts operate with 
extremely uneven data. The courts handle large numbers of 
defendants with underfunded and antiquated computers.40 The 
people who spend the most time in criminal courts, on behalf of 
themselves and their family members charged with crimes, are not 
rich, well-organized, or politically influential. The funding for 
criminal court data is anemic, and the political landscape keeps it 
that way.  
Given this data environment, it would be especially 
challenging to learn in detail about a criminal defense lawyer’s 
work based on court or office records. Much of the recorded 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Wright, supra note 23, at 1516–17 (discussing how civil issues now 
often accompany criminal issues).  
 36. Cf. Simon, supra note 33, at 402–04 (describing resistance to the 
evaluation of lawyer quality). 
 37. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2012). 
 38. See id.; N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2003). 
 39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 40. See William T. Robinson III, Criminal Justice Reforms Enhance Public 
Safety and Strengthen Our Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2012/home/Leadership 
-and-the-Courts/4-1-Enhancing-Public-Safety.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(discussing the negative impact of budget cuts for courts) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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information is only captured on paper, with surprisingly little of 
it transferred to electronic format.41 The information that does 
make it into electronic format lands in separate data systems 
that do not communicate with each other.42 The quality of data 
available for any given criminal case is shallow and appalling, 
even though the sheer number of cases is impressive.  
Talent evaluators in other contexts have dealt with this 
problem, finding ways to draw restrained but meaningful 
insights from the limited data. As dramatized in Moneyball, a 
manager in professional sports can use performance data to 
evaluate talent and to develop players.43 For instance, hitters 
with strong on-base percentages and strike zone discipline 
caught the attention of the Oakland A’s.44 Minor league players 
in the A’s organization learned at every level the importance of 
walks and forcing the opposing pitcher to throw extra pitches.45 
Statistical analysis has also taken a heavier role in player 
selection and game planning in other sports, such as 
basketball—sports that traditionally placed less emphasis on 
collecting or analyzing performance statistics.46  
Statistical ratings have also become salient (and 
controversial) for other complex service industries, such as 
education and health care.47 School systems show a growing 
                                                                                                     
 41. Melissa Maynard, State Courts Replacing Paper with Electronic Record 
Keeping, PEW CTR. ON STS. (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/ 
stateline/headlines/state-courts-replacing-paper-with-electronic-record-keeping-858 
99382276 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining the difficulty in switching to 
electronic record keeping) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. See id. (discussing the lack of electronic records preservation programs 
in Texas).  
 43. Moneyball, supra note 1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Brian Mossop, Basketball Isn’t a Sport. It’s a Statistical Network, 
WIRED (Dec. 7, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/playbook/2012/12/basket 
ball-network-analysis/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the use of statistical 
analysis in basketball) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 47. See Deborah Kenny, Want to Ruin Teaching? Give Ratings, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/opinion/want-to-ruin-
teaching-give-ratings.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (arguing against 
government evaluation of teachers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Eric Zorn, Why Teachers Have Test Anxiety, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2012), 
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interest in quantitative performance evaluations of teachers in 
primary and secondary schools.48 Those performance 
evaluations, once based on ad hoc observations by school 
principals, increasingly include a component based on the test 
score performance of the teacher’s students.49 There is dispute 
about an appropriate weight to place on test scores, as compared 
to personal observation of teaching and evaluation of lesson 
plans and other documentation of the teacher’s work.50 The 
advocates for ratings, such as student test performance, concede 
that they must control for socioeconomic status and other 
predictors of student performance to make realistic judgments 
about how much “value” the teacher adds above and beyond the 
improvements in scores that one might expect from a given 
group of students.51 Teacher ratings that include test score 
performance also create dilemmas about who should have access 
to those ratings.52 It is a complicated landscape for teacher 
evaluation, but ratings based in part on student test 
performance appear to be a settled part of the scene.53  
Data-based evaluations have also arrived in health care. 
Hospitals keep detailed records of treatment decisions and 
                                                                                                     
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-14/news/ct-oped-0914-zorn-20120914_ 
1_value-added-approach-bad-teachers-teacher-evaluation-process (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013) (expressing skepticism at the use of test scores in teacher 
evaluations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Can School 
Performance Be Measured Fairly, in Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/07/29/can-school-performance-
be-measured-fairly/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the debate over 
evaluation of school performance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 48. See Zorn, supra note 47 (explaining a public school system’s wish to use 
“value added” analysis to evaluate teachers). 
 49. See id. (discussing the role of test scores in evaluations). 
 50. See Kenny, supra note 47 (raising objections to the use of test scores). 
 51. Zorn, supra note 47.  
 52. Cf. Adam Shanks, Parents Will Have Access to Teacher Evaluations, LEGIS. 
GAZETTE (June 25, 2012), http://www.legislativegazette.com/Articles-Top-Stories-c-
2012-06-25-81858.113122-Parents-will-have-access-to-teacher-evaluations.html (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing debate over parents’ access to teacher evaluations) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. See Zorn, supra note 47 (noting that performance-based evaluations 
will soon be used in every state). 
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patient outcomes.54 Some of those data are only now taking 
electronic form, and many of the electronic data are incompatible 
and inaccessible (the same situation we find in state criminal 
justice).55 Nevertheless, this is a changing data landscape. As 
more data about treatment and patient outcomes become 
available, it becomes possible to rate the performance of 
particular sectors of the industry, or particular hospitals, or even 
particular doctors.56 Particularly, given the recently expanded 
access to the enormous database showing treatments and 
outcomes for Medicare and Medicaid patients, analysts have 
begun to rate particular practice areas and hospitals and to 
release those ratings to the public.57 The hospitals often take 
issue with the comparison groups that the researchers choose or 
other research design questions.58 Still, the use of performance 
data as one component in evaluations of a complex service 
appears to have staying power in the health care field. 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Improved Diagnostics and Patient Outcomes, HEALTHIT, http:// 
www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/improved-diagnostics-patient-outcomes 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing benefits of electronic health records) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 55. See Fig Gungor, Disadvantages of Electronic Medical Records, 
ONESOURCE (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.onesourcedoc.com/blog/bid/71535/Dis 
advantages-of-Electronic-Medical-Records (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining 
how disparate systems are difficult to synchronize and result in duplications) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 56. See About Leapfrog, LEAPFROG GROUP, http://www.leapfroggroup. 
org/about_leapfrog (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing performance evaluation 
for health care) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 57. See Jordan Rau, Patient Ratings to Affect Medicare Payments to 
Hospitals, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-
04-28/national/35262055_1_hospital-room-small-community-hospitals-hospitals-
conduct (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“Medicare has been publishing patient-
satisfaction scores on its Hospital Compare Web site since 2008 . . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 58. Jordan Rau, Teaching Hospitals Decry Medicare’s Low Safety Rankings, 
BOSTON.COM (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/health/articles/ 
2012/02/13/teaching_hospitals_challenge_low_safety_ranking_by_medicare/ (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the negative reaction to hospital evaluations) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); National Rankings for 
Hospitals, HEALTH INSIGHT, http://www.healthinsight.org/Internal/Hospital 
PerformanceRankings.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining quality 
measures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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The people who evaluate complex services such as education 
or health care find it worthwhile to gather and analyze 
performance data. They do so despite the limitations of the data 
and the need to combine the statistical ratings with more in-
depth personal observation. Could the same hold true for the 
work of criminal defense attorneys?  
IV. A Bottom-Line System to Rate Attorneys 
In this Part, we describe past efforts to use performance data 
in evaluating criminal defense lawyers. Building on that history, 
we describe our design for a system to rate North Carolina’s 
criminal defense lawyers, based on publicly available data. 
A. Comparing Public Defenders to Private Defense Attorneys 
The use of data to rate the effectiveness of defense attorneys 
has long fascinated legal scholars. Dozens of evaluations have 
appeared in print over the years, going back at least to the 
1930s.59 Most of those efforts compare three sets of attorneys, 
evaluated as groups: public defenders, appointed counsel from 
private practice, and retained attorneys. These studies tie into 
perennial legislative policy debates about whether to create 
public defender services, and how to get the best results from 
limited public funds.60  
Three design features of the quantitative studies interest us 
here. The authors conducting the study must choose a measure of 
attorney success; to use the lingo of social science empiricism, 
they must decide how to operationalize the dependent variable. 
In addition, the study design must select which aspects of the 
attorneys’ background and environment might contribute to 
successful outcomes; these are the independent variables of 
                                                                                                     
 59. Floyd Feeney & Patrick Johnson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, 
Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal Defense Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 
361, 416 tbl.3 (1991) (listing studies dating back to 1935). 
 60. For an excellent review of the enormous number of early studies, see id. 
at 365–78. 
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interest. Finally, the researchers must decide which influences, 
apart from attorney effort, might contribute in some degree to the 
chosen output; that is, the studies must include independent 
variables that interact with the variables of interest.  
As for the first design feature, the earliest studies used a 
variety of measures for attorney quality. Some focused on the 
amount and type of activity of an attorney, such as the number of 
motions filed in a case, the number of cases that the lawyer tried, 
or various measures of speedy processing of cases.61 Others 
looked to outcomes—the proportion of defendants convicted—
with attorneys rated more highly when they achieved lower 
conviction rates.62 The early studies also inquired about the type 
of sentence that the defendant received, giving attorneys credit 
for those defendants who avoided prison sentences.63  
                                                                                                     
 61. See ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE 
AND DONE WELL 39–48 (1992) (total time of disposition); STEVEN K. SMITH & 
CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE 4 tbl.7 (1996) 
(measure based on lawyer meeting client within one week of arrest); id. at 45 
tbl.11 (trial rates); Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense 
of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 766–70 
(1986–1987) (number of motions); see generally Note, Representation of 
Indigents in California—A Field Study of the Public Defender and Assigned 
Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REV. 522 (1960). 
 62. See Joyce S. Sterling, Retained Counsel Versus the Public Defender: The 
Impact of Type of Counsel on Charge Bargaining, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 151, 
160–62 (William McDonald ed., 1983) (comparing outcomes between types of 
attorneys); Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at 
Weak Cases, Prior Records and Leniency in Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 
258 tbl.1 (1989) (comparing plea bargain outcomes between private attorneys 
and public defenders).  
 63. See Richard L. Grier, Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel 
and Public Defender Systems, 49 N.C. L. REV. 705, 714 (1971) (comparing the 
percentage of convictions given probation or suspended sentence for public 
defenders and assigned counsel); Pauline Houlden & Steven Balkin, Quality and 
Cost Comparisons of Private Bar Indigent Defense Systems: Contract vs. Ordered 
Assigned Counsel, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 176, 179 (1985) (comparing 
convictions and sentences for clients of assigned counsel and public defenders); 
Stuart S. Nagel, Effects of Alternative Types of Counsel on Criminal Procedure 
Treatment, 48 IND. L.J. 404, 414–18 (1973) (comparing results for clients with 
hired counsel and provided counsel); Jean G. Taylor et al., An Analysis of 
Defense Counsel in the Processing of Felony Defendants in Denver, Colorado, 50 
DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 19–21 (1973) (same); Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Note, 
Slipping Away from Justice: The Effect of Attorney Skill on Trial Outcomes, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 267, 270–78 (2010) (describing prior research).  
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More recent studies homed in on the length of prison or jail 
terms and other measures of sentence severity as the measure of 
attorney quality.64 This measure of attorney performance has 
several advantages. First, it asks a question that court data can 
answer: what sentence (if any) did the court impose on the 
defendant at the end of the trial court proceedings? Second, this 
measure asks something that is on the mind of many defendants. 
While the bottom line of punishment is not the only concern of 
defendants, clients ultimately want to know what penalty will 
result, not how many motions the attorney will file.65 If two 
clients are convicted of the same crime, despite the efforts of 
equally active and empathetic defense lawyers, the client who 
receives the lower sentence would presumably rate that attorney 
more highly.66  
After choosing a type of activity or outcome that 
approximates an overall high quality of lawyering, the researcher 
also must estimate how much of that “success” to attribute to the 
lawyer, and how much to attribute to other factors, such as the 
seriousness of the charge, the offender’s prior record, other 
offender characteristics, the practices of the prosecutor or the 
judge, and so forth.67 Put another way, a researcher who hopes to 
rate the quality of defense counsel must set expectations. How 
                                                                                                     
 64. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the 
Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 
YALE L.J. 154, 178–87 (2012) (using multiple measures of attorney success, 
including conviction rate, life sentence versus death penalty, and length of 
prison term); Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, An 
Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the 
“Marginally Indigent,” 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 231 (2005) (studying different 
outcomes in plea bargaining). But see Richard Posner & Albert Yoon, What 
Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324–
39 (2011) (using quality measures other than sentencing outcomes, such as 
findings based on judicial surveys).  
 65. See Hoffman et al., supra note 64, at 225 (“What criminal defendants 
care most about . . . is the actual outcome of the case . . . .”). 
 66. Interview with Robin Steinberg, Exec. Dir., Bronx Defenders, in 
Lexington, Va. (Nov. 8–9, 2012); cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 
115–24 (2006) (examining the factors affecting whether someone believes that 
process is fair).  
 67. See Anderson & Heaton, supra note 64, at 156 (testing the criminal 
justice system’s sensitivity to the quality of defense counsel). 
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much success should one expect for certain types of cases, and 
how much “value added” can one fairly attribute to higher quality 
defense lawyering, given the other constraints of the case? How 
does one measure how well the attorney performs with the 
materials at hand?  
Again, studies have evolved over time. The earliest research 
simply calculated the relevant measure of success for the 
different types of defense lawyers.68 They did not control for 
factors related to the “raw materials” presented to the defense 
attorney. Later studies recognized this problem and started to 
control for the seriousness of the initial charges against the 
defendant. The prior criminal record of the defendant also 
became a feature in the studies, along with other defendant 
characteristics.69  
In addition to evolving measures of attorney success and 
increasing efforts to separate the quality of lawyering from the 
nature of the “raw material” presented to the attorney, 
researchers over the years began to ask about the personal 
backgrounds and work environments of defense attorneys that 
might explain the quality of lawyering they could offer.70 For 
decades, the only input that attracted any attention was the form 
of organization: public defender offices versus appointed private 
counsel versus retained private counsel.71 Some of the more 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Feeney & Johnson, supra note 59, at 365–66.  
 69. See MICHAEL ROACH, EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME GAP BETWEEN 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIGENT DEFENSE COUNSEL: ADVERSE SELECTION AND 
MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS 10–11 (2011) (including defendant characteristics in his 
study). 
 70. See Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent 
Defense Counsel 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 
2007) (comparing attorney backgrounds). 
 71. That environmental factor remains the independent variable of interest 
in some recent studies. See THOMAS H. COHEN, WHO’S BETTER AT DEFENDING 
CRIMINALS? DOES TYPE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY MATTER IN TERMS OF PRODUCING 
FAVORABLE CASE OUTCOMES 2 (2011) (comparing public defenders, assigned 
counsel, and private attorneys); David Allan Felice, Justice Rationed: A Look at 
Alabama’s Present Indigent Defense System with a Vision Towards Change, 52 
ALA. L. REV. 975, 991–95 (2000) (same); Kuo-Chang Huan, Kong-Pin Chen & 
Chang-Ching Lin, Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Affect Case 
Outcomes? A Natural Experiment in Taiwan, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 113, 117–
18 (2010) (comparing public defenders and appointed counsel); Peter A. Joy & 
Kevin C. McMunigal, Does the Lawyer Make a Difference? Public Defender Versus 
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recent studies, however, also ask about factors such as the 
amount of experience and the demographics of individual 
attorneys as possible explanations for stronger lawyer 
performances.72  
The quantitative studies of lawyer effectiveness over the 
years have produced varied results. Some indicate that public 
defenders are more effective than retained counsel, while others 
conclude the opposite.73 Some indicate that more experienced 
attorneys tend to be more effective, while others find no such 
effect.74 Some find evidence that lawyers with particular 
backgrounds get better results for criminal defendants; for 
instance, Abrams and Yoon conclude that Hispanic attorneys in 
the Las Vegas public defender office got better results for 
criminal defendants, possibly because they were not hampered by 
language barriers with the clients and witnesses.75  
Such conflicting results in the historical studies do not 
surprise us. Given the amazing variety of models that different 
jurisdictions use to deliver criminal defense services around the 
country, it is easy to believe that different factors explain the 
success of attorneys in those different systems. The major 
changes over time in the structure of criminal defense 
organizations also suggest that the formula for success changes 
over the years.  
The task of a manager of criminal defense services in a 
particular place and a given time is not to declare the universal 
conditions necessary to do the job well. The real challenge is to 
measure local conditions and to make the most of the resources at 
hand. A clear-eyed view of the available data can contribute to 
that wise management. 
                                                                                                     
Appointed Counsel, A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. (Spring 2012), http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_magazine/sp12_ethics.auth 
checkdam.pdf (same).  
 72. See Iyengar, supra note 70, at 4–6 (analyzing attorney characteristics). 
 73. See Anderson & Heaton, supra note 64, at 157 n.6.  
 74. David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using 
Random Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1145, 1145 (2007).  
 75. Id. at 1175. 
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B. Attorney Ratings in a Guideline Sentencing World 
The rich history of quantitative studies of defense counsel 
quality is a hopeful sign for our demonstration project; it suggests 
that such an exercise can bear fruit. At the same time, the 
challenges in building and designing a credible quantitative 
study are daunting. A database that is assembled one time only, 
based on the full-time effort of researchers putting together data 
sources that normally do not integrate, would be difficult to 
replicate for managers in hundreds of offices using real-world 
budgets, schedules, and expertise. In some cases, the researchers 
must extract case-level information from paper files to include in 
the data. What works under social science laboratory conditions 
may not work in the field.  
We believe, nevertheless, that we can demonstrate the 
practicality of performance-based evaluations under field 
conditions. Two factors in our test jurisdiction—features that are 
not especially unusual—work in our favor. First, North Carolina 
collects some statewide data about criminal court operations in 
ACIS, the Automated Criminal Infractions System.76 Granted, 
ACIS is a balky older program with surprising gaps (the core of 
the program was written in 1968), but it does offer to actors in 
the system an electronic record of charges filed, disposition of 
those charges, sentences imposed, and the names of key actors in 
each case. It also allows us to compare, when appropriate, the 
performance of defense lawyers across different districts in the 
state, giving us a better vantage point to notice the differences 
that office organization and other environmental distinctions 
might make for attorney performance.  
The presence of sentencing guidelines in North Carolina 
offers a second natural design advantage.77 Sentencing guidelines 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Courtflow, N.C. CTS. SYS., http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/ 
Technology/Applications/CourtFlow.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing 
ACIS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.14 (West 2012) (establishing 
sentencing guidelines according to prior criminal history). Almost half of the states 
operate some form of sentencing guidelines. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing 
Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1190, 1191 (2005) (“Sentencing guidelines have been adopted in at least eighteen 
states and the District of Columbia . . . .”). For some speculation about 
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encourage system actors to use common sentencing practices or to 
declare explicitly why the case at hand deserves special 
treatment.78 Guidelines therefore make it easier to predict the 
expected sentencing effects of factors such as the crime of 
conviction or the defendant’s prior criminal record. In short, 
sentencing guidelines allow researchers to measure more 
precisely some features of the raw materials that attorneys 
inherit.79  
What follows, then, is a step-by-step account of how we 
converted state court data into a crude but serviceable measure of 
some relevant aspects of criminal defense work.  
1. Choice of Attorney Quality Measure 
Like other recent researchers, we favor a quality metric 
focused on the sentencing reductions that the defense lawyer 
obtains. Such a measure focuses on an outcome that matters to 
defendants, and one that captures the negotiation skills that are 
central to modern criminal practice.  
Such a one-dimensional measure would not be appropriate 
when evaluating the work of prosecutors.80 The prosecutor’s work 
necessarily balances competing interests of immediate crime 
victims, potential future victims, law enforcement agencies, the 
public’s interest in a sense of public safety, and even the 
defendant’s long-term interests. Prosecutors, who have invested 
serious effort in multi-factor performance measures, recognize 
                                                                                                     
some potential advantages of measuring defense counsel performance in a 
sentencing guideline jurisdiction, see Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to 
Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity from Differences in Defense 
Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435, 439 (2002). 
 78. See id.  § 15A-1340.16  (discussing aggravating and mitigating factors). 
 79. Abrams & Yoon, supra note 74, at 1149, addressed this selection bias 
issue in the caseload by studying a public defender office that assigns cases to 
attorneys on a random basis, a relatively unusual situation. See also Anderson 
& Heaton, supra note 64, at 159 (studying a public defender office that 
randomly assigns murder cases). 
 80. See Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid 
the Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 57–65 (2007) (addressing 
problems with evaluation based solely on convictions).  
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER MONEYBALL 1243 
this complexity.81 The severity of sentences that a prosecutor 
obtains, standing alone, would be an unacceptable measure of 
quality.  
This difficulty is less acute, however, for defense attorneys. 
The defendant’s lawyer pursues the interests of the client. That 
duty raises subtle questions about the full range of legal problems 
(civil and criminal) that might face a defendant, and the lawyer 
may want to help the client consider short-term versus long-term 
interests.82 But the sentencing outcome for a given criminal case, 
under mainstream views of the defense attorney’s job, is central 
to the attorney’s success. Sometimes the attorney holds a weak 
hand, but it is reasonably clear what the defense lawyer should 
try to accomplish with the cards as dealt.  
2. Starting Point and Value Added 
As we calculate the sentence reductions that the attorney 
achieves in the case, we must set both the expected starting point 
and the end point for the sentence. In North Carolina, ACIS 
offers the arraignment charge against a defendant as a starting 
point.83 We can estimate the value of the case before the defense 
attorney ever gets involved.  
Sentencing guidelines allow us to make a reasonable 
estimate for the sentence that would ordinarily attach to any 
combination of a particular charge with a particular criminal 
history category (a factor also captured in ACIS). Knowing the 
offense class of the arraignment charge and the defendant’s 
criminal history category, we calculate the “starting point” 
                                                                                                     
 81. See M. Elaine Nugent-Borokove et al., Performance Measures for 
Prosecutors: Findings from the Application of Performance Measures in Two 
Prosecutors’ Offices, NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N 1 (Apr. 2007), http:// 
www.ndaa.org/pdf/performance_measures_findings_07.pdf (acknowledging the 
diverse roles played by prosecutors). 
 82. See Wright, supra note 23, at 1516–17 (noting the inclusion of civil 
penalties in criminal cases). 
 83. Our data captures any judicial action taken as of June 1, 2010, in any 
case originally filed as a felony during calendar year 2006. We chose 2006 in an 
effort to give most cases a chance to complete their path through the system to 
sentencing.  
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sentence as the number of days of incarceration that a judge 
would impose after selecting the bottom of the “presumptive” 
range in the relevant box of the sentencing grid (a box that 
already reflects the seriousness of the offense and the extent of 
the prior criminal record). We chose this point in the available 
range because it is the most common choice among North 
Carolina sentencing judges when exercising their available 
discretion within this system.84 For instance, we assign to 
breaking and entering (a Class H felony) an expected sentence 
ranging from five months for a defendant with no criminal 
history (Category I) up to sixteen months for a defendant with an 
extensive criminal history (Category VI).  
As for the end-point sentence, the ACIS system records the 
crime of conviction and the type of sentence actually imposed 
(incarceration or non-incarceration), along with the length of any 
prison or jail term.85 By subtracting the duration of the sentence 
imposed from the duration of the expected sentence (based on the 
arraignment charge), we can see the “value added” for a 
defendant in any given case. The larger the value added, the 
more successful the defense attorney.  
                                                                                                     
 84. See N.C. SENT’G & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING 
STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS 18–20 (2012). Another 
important aspect of the sentencing judge’s discretion under state law is the 
choice between concurrent and consecutive sentences in multiple-count cases. 
We included in our ratings any sentences listed separately in the ACIS system; 
a more refined system would screen out the multi-count sentences to be served 
concurrently.  
 85. North Carolina sentencing law gives the judge, within some grid boxes, 
a choice of “community” sentence for correctional programs that do not restrict 
the offender’s physical liberty, or an “intermediate” sentence under correctional 
programs that restrict the offender’s movement less than an active prison term 
but more than a community sanction would. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-
1340.11 (West 2012) (defining “community” and “intermediate” sentences). We 
treated community sentences as a sentence of zero days, and treated 
intermediate punishments as equivalent in length to an active prison term. In 
customizing a rating system for a particular jurisdiction, one could alternatively 
score intermediate and community punishments as some fraction of the 
equivalent number of days for an active prison sentence. 
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3. Comparisons Among Cases, Crimes, and Districts 
Once a rater knows the amount of sentencing reduction in a 
given case, how does one judge whether the reduction is a high, 
low, or normal amount? Our answer is to compare the attorney in 
a single case with the pool of all attorneys statewide who 
represented defendants charged with the same offense at 
arraignment. For each crime in the arraignment charge column, 
we calculated the statewide average in reductions of sentence in 
all cases starting out with that charge.86 For example, defendants 
who were arraigned on a charge of breaking and entering 
received an average reduction of 105 days from their expected 
starting point sentence to the sentence actually imposed on them. 
An attorney who achieved reductions greater than 105 days for a 
defendant initially charged with breaking and entering 
performed above the statewide average in that case.  
Other comparison pools are also possible. Rather than 
looking to a statewide average within a single crime for attorney 
performance, one might instead compare one attorney to others 
working in the same prosecutorial district—those who negotiate 
against the same prosecutors in the same courthouse 
environment. The difficulty with this strategy, however, is the 
problem of small numbers. Any given district might produce too 
few charges of robbery with a dangerous weapon during a single 
year to provide a reliable average score for purposes of 
comparison. Managers who prefer to draw comparisons within 
their own prosecutorial district might do so by combining data 
from several years.87  
                                                                                                     
 86. The average reduction for each criminal history category within each 
crime would produce a more thorough account of the effect of criminal history, 
but such calculations would lead to a small numbers problem for most crimes in 
the system. A single statewide average for all criminal history categories still 
reflects the amount of movement from an expected starting point that considers 
criminal history, to an end point that also considers criminal history. The 
pooling of all the categories does blur any noteworthy differences in the amount 
of movement that may happen in different criminal history categories. 
 87. Alternatively, a manager might remain within a single prosecutorial 
district by using all crimes at a given offense class as the relevant comparison 
pool. We opted instead to use single crimes on a statewide basis because the 
opportunities for movement might differ dramatically among crimes within the 
same offense class. See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney Engen, The Charging and 
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Some types of crimes routinely produced greater movement 
than other crimes. To make it easier to compare the value added 
for defendants across different crimes, we calculated the standard 
deviation for the sentence reductions within each crime as 
charged at arraignment. Thus, even though the average 
movement for breaking and entering as an arraignment charge 
was a reduction of 105 days, while the average movement for 
robbery with a dangerous weapon was an increase of 563 days, an 
attorney who performed slightly better than two-thirds of the 
attorneys in the state on a robbery charge (that is, one standard 
deviation from the average for that crime) gained the same rating 
benefit as an attorney who performed slightly better than two-
thirds of the attorneys in the state on a breaking and entering 
charge. This method allows us to weight cases equally, 
preventing a few high-movement cases from swamping the effects 
of all the other cases.  
4. Compiling the Case Ratings of Individual Attorneys 
Our next step is to combine all of the individual scores for an 
attorney’s cases into a single “index” score to estimate the 
attorney’s typical “value added.” The manager might calculate 
the average score for that attorney’s cases over a one-year or 
multi-year period.88 A manager who wants to estimate how much 
value a defense attorney in the office usually adds to a 
defendant’s case could glance down a list of these index scores. 
The more cases that appear in the database, the more 
comfortable the manager could be that the ratings reveal 
something meaningful and are not based on a few atypical cases.  
These calculations of sentence movement offer only a partial 
picture: the manager would want to inquire more carefully about 
                                                                                                     
Sentencing Effects of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
1935, 1970 (2006) (“[W]e see meaningful differences in the magnitude of 
reductions among different types of crimes, even those originally charged at the 
same offense class.”).  
 88. If the manager believes that some of the highest and lowest scores in an 
attorney’s portfolio reflect unusual cases that should not carry much weight in 
the overall rating, the system could rely on the median score rather than the 
mean.  
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the reasons behind apparently weak numbers on sentence 
movement when compared to other attorneys. Given the major 
differences in cases that the ACIS data does not capture, a 
manager would be irresponsible to attach any meaning to small 
differences among attorneys. For larger differences that build up 
across many cases that an attorney handles, a manager should 
heed the warning and inquire more closely.  
Table 1 illustrates the type of report that a manager of 
criminal defense attorneys could receive on a routine basis. The 
scores we report here are based on actual calculations from the 
ACIS data for the criminal defense attorneys who practice 
regularly in a single prosecutorial district.89 Most of their index 
scores clump between -1 and 1 because the underlying case scores 
are expressed in standard deviations. The “N” column indicates 
the number of sentenced cases appearing in the database for that 
lawyer; attorney scores based on a higher number of case 
performances are more likely to reflect real performance 
differences than an attorney average based on fewer cases.  
  
                                                                                                     
 89. Table 1 includes every attorney in District 18 with more than thirty 
sentences recorded in our 2006 felony data. Although the scores and the 
underlying data are genuine, we changed the attorney names in a Dickensian 
spirit.  
1248 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221 (2013) 
Table 1: Sample Report of Attorney Value-Added Scores 
Defense Attorneys in Prosecutorial District 18 
ATTORNEY NAME VALUE  
ADDED 
N MARGIN OF 
ERROR, +/- 
Agnes Wickfield 0.45 35 0.70 
Sydney Carton 0.29 32 0.73 
Tommy Traddles 0.28 85 0.16 
Amy Dorrit 0.19 31 0.29 
Jarvis Lorry 0.18 132 0.13 
Thomas Gradgrind 0.15 32 0.22 
Betsy Trotwood 0.12 55 0.18 
Josiah Tulkinghorn 0.10 69 0.19 
Kate Nickleby 0.08 158 0.17 
Simon Tappertit 0.03 93 0.08 
Esther Summerson 0.02 79 0.16 
Wilkins Micawber 0.01 38 0.12 
Charity Pecksniff -0.02 37 0.17 
Thomas Lenville -0.03 55 0.17 
Jonas Chuzzlewit -0.03 64 0.07 
Grace Jeddler -0.03 70 0.13 
Mortimer Lightwood -0.05 90 0.11 
Estella Havisham -0.05 56 0.07 
Eugene Wrayburn -0.07 31 0.27 
Elizabeth Hexam -0.07 57 0.10 
Waived -0.07 191 0.07 
Martha Bardell -0.11 135 0.29 
Leicester Dedlock -0.21 102 0.27 
Sampson Brass -0.23 165 0.27 
Uriah Heep -0.35 34 0.61 
The “Margin of Error, +/-” column shows the level of 
confidence that a manager could place in an attorney’s score in 
light of the number of cases the attorney handled and the 
dispersion of individual case scores.90 Thus, a manager reading 
                                                                                                     
 90. The margin of error for the mean index score for each attorney is 
calculated at the 95% confidence level. This number is a function of the number 
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this report could have some confidence that Tommy Traddles 
performed at a routinely high level during the year in comparison 
to other attorneys around the state who represented defendants 
facing the same charges and presenting the same prior criminal 
records. The report indicates that a manager can have 95% 
confidence that Traddles’s true average score falls somewhere 
between 0.44 and 0.12. On the other hand, the manager would be 
more cautious in drawing conclusions about Agnes Wickfield and 
Sydney Carton because the margin of error for both of those 
attorneys is larger. In both cases, the small number of cases and 
the wide dispersion of the scores in that lawyer’s portfolio mean 
that the positive score here might be unreliable, the product of 
sampling error. In Carton’s case, the “true” score probably falls 
somewhere between 1.02 and -0.44. Given the scores and margins 
of error reported here, it seems reasonable to assume that 
Traddles, Dorrit, Lorry, Gradgrind, Trotwood, and Tulkinghorn 
all turned in positive performances for the year.  
On the other hand, a reader of this report might begin to 
worry about the performance of Leicester Dedlock and Sampson 
Brass. In both cases, the value added score is a good deal lower 
than other attorneys who regularly represented defendants in the 
district, and the margin of error is small enough to put almost the 
entire confidence interval in the negative range. Although Uriah 
Heep turned in the weakest average score in the district, the high 
margin of error should lead a manager to be careful in drawing 
conclusions about his performance during the year. Note that 
four attorneys in the district added less value, on average, than 
the typical defendant who waived defense counsel altogether.91  
The same data in a ratings system could also produce other 
reports to shed light on the performance of defense counsel in a 
district. For instance, a report might inform a manager about the 
performance of defense attorneys in particular crimes, compared 
                                                                                                     
of cases handled and the standard deviation of the scores for that attorney. 
Larger numbers of cases and smaller standard deviations produce tighter 
confidence intervals.  
 91. Cf. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An 
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 423–24, 
486–87 (2007) (suggesting, based on a tentative analysis, that pro se defendants 
achieve results at least as strong as appointed counsel).  
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to the performance of defense attorneys elsewhere in the state. 
The defense attorneys in District 13 together produced an 
average Value Added score of 2.06 in 32 cases initially charged as 
taking indecent liberties with a child. On the other hand, they 
generated an average score of -1.73 in 38 cases arraigned as a 
robbery with a dangerous weapon. An attorney presented with 
this report would want to inquire more closely as to why the 
results achieved in District 13 are so much stronger (relative to 
other defense attorneys in the state) for indecent liberties than 
for robbery. Perhaps the answer lies in local prosecutorial policies 
or the practices of local judges. It is also possible that defense 
attorneys in District 13 are failing to pursue a tactic in their 
robbery cases that works well elsewhere in the state. Whatever 
the explanations, the discrepancy deserves some attention among 
defense attorneys. Those who look for patterns in local outcomes 
know what questions to ask.  
C. Customizing Reports 
The design choices we made in our demonstration model of a 
rating system are not set in stone. Each aspect of the rating—the 
use of sentencing movement as the sole measure of attorney 
performance, the selection of a starting point sentence, and the 
choice of the relevant comparison pool of defense attorneys—
could play out differently to produce a system quite distinct from 
ours. The ability to change these parameters is a strength in a 
rating system. A manager could customize the system to address 
questions that are local concerns or priorities.  
In particular, a manager might opt for a multi-factor 
measure of attorney success. There are many aspects of attorney 
performance that our initial rating effort misses by concentrating 
only on cases that result in some amount of incarceration. It is a 
genuine success for an attorney when the state dismisses charges 
against a defendant, or the jury acquits at trial, or the judge 
imposes probation or some other community sanction that 
includes no period of detention.  
The ACIS system includes data on each of these case-level 
events, and one could construct a measure of attorney success 
that includes them. Other relevant measures of attorney success, 
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such as the reduction of “embedded consequences” like 
immigration removal or loss of public housing, might become a 
part of the rating if the defense counsel organization were to 
collect its own data to supplement court data.92 If the defender 
office surveys its clients about their level of satisfaction with 
their lawyers, then that survey result could become a component 
of the attorney’s rating score.93  
A customized measure along these lines could take the form 
of an index score, assigning various percentages of an overall 
score to different types of success, blended to suit the needs of the 
rater. For example, the organization might construct a rating 
score that is based 30% on incarceration sentences imposed, 20% 
for non-incarceration sentences, 10% for embedded consequences, 
10% for dismissals, 10% for acquittals, and 20% for client 
satisfaction. Alternatively, the manager might track each of these 
ratings separately, without attempting to combine them into a 
single rating. 
V. The Environment for Success 
With case-level success ratings in hand, an evaluator of 
defense attorneys might turn naturally to questions about 
causation. What factors explain why some attorneys achieve 
stronger scores than others? Are there recurring case features 
that make it harder for any attorney to succeed? And are there 
recurring aspects of an attorney’s background, experience, or 
work environment that are associated more often with stronger 
                                                                                                     
 92. For example, in Padilla v. Kentucky, the risk of deportation of an alien 
was a factor used in evaluating the performance prong of the analysis for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 
(2010) (holding that counsel engaged in deficient performance by failing to 
advise defendant that his plea of guilty made him subject to automatic 
deportation). 
 93. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 445 (2009) (proposing the use of surveys as one component of 
prosecutor evaluation). Defense, like prosecution, is multi-faceted. Every client 
is different, and some clients do not care primarily about the outcome in 
criminal court; they only want their day in court. Cf. Tyler, supra note 66, at 
115–24. A rating that combined outcomes and client satisfaction might be closer 
to ideal.  
1252 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221 (2013) 
sentencing movement for the client? In this Part, we illustrate 
some ways that performance data might combine with 
biographical details about individual attorneys and data about 
the local courthouse environment to inform evaluators as they 
think about the drivers of attorney success. 
A. Who Are These Guys? 
In an effort to answer these causation questions, we built a 
database for a subset of the attorneys in the statewide ACIS 
system. Our sample consists of 215 North Carolina criminal 
defense attorneys. We chose the sample based on two criteria: 
geographic diversity and the number of cases the attorneys 
handled. We selected 14 of the 44 prosecutorial districts from 
around the state (oversampling the busiest districts in the 
system), and for each of these districts, we identified the defense 
attorneys with the most case dispositions. For most districts, this 
meant selecting between 15 and 25 attorneys, but in a few 
districts, we selected fewer than 10, based on the relatively low 
volume of case dispositions in those districts. In some districts, 
the state operates a public defender’s office; in others, the court 
appoints criminal defense lawyers from private practice. In both 
types of districts, defendants retain their own attorneys in some 
cases. Table 2 describes the 14 prosecutorial districts. 
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4 Jacksonville (Onslow, Duplin, 
Sampson, and Jones Counties) 
No 20 
5 Wilmington (New Hanover and 
Pender Counties) 
Yes 27 
9 Granville, Vance, Franklin, and 
Warren Counties 
No 20 
9A Caswell and Person Counties No 2 
10 Raleigh (Wake County) Yes 15 
12 Fayetteville (Cumberland 
County) 
Yes 31 
13 Bladen, Brunswick, and 
Columbus Counties 
No 18 
18 Greensboro (Guilford County) Yes 8 
19D Southern Pines (Moore County) No 7 
21 Winston-Salem (Forsyth County) Yes 13 
25 Burke, Caldwell, and Catawba 
Counties 
No 18 
26 Charlotte (Mecklenburg County) Yes 10 
27A Gastonia (Gaston County) Yes 22 
29B Henderson, Polk, and 
Transylvania Counties 
Yes 4 
Totals  8 Yes/ 6 No 215 
Because we wanted to learn if one or more attributes of the 
defense attorney’s background or experience could explain 
performance,94 we collected data from public sources on a number 
of characteristics. These included personal characteristics such as 
gender, race (Caucasian, Black, Latino, Asian, Native American, 
or Other), and political party affiliation (Democrat, Republican, 
Libertarian, or Unaffiliated).  
Second, we collected attorney characteristics that could 
reflect the quality of the lawyer’s education and professional 
experience. These included the number of case dispositions, the 
year the attorney was admitted to the bar, the law school the 
attorney attended, the attorney’s type of practice (classified as 
                                                                                                     
 94. See Ryan D. King, Kecia R. Johnson & Kelly McGeever, Demography of 
the Legal Profession and Racial Disparities in Sentencing, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 
1, 1, 26 (2010) (hypothesizing that racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing are 
mitigated where the legal profession is more diverse). 
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public defender, solo practitioner, or law firm), the size of the law 
firm,95 whether the attorney limited his or her practice to 
criminal defense, and whether the North Carolina State Bar had 
ever disciplined the attorney.96  
Third, we gathered data that could shed light on the quality 
of the attorney’s connections to the local community, to local 
jurors and law enforcement officers, and to prosecutors. In other 
negotiation contexts, longstanding relationships among the 
negotiating parties can predict strong performances.97 Under this 
heading, we collected data about the primary city where the 
attorney practices, the city where the attorney lives, and whether 
the law school the attorney attended was located outside North 
Carolina.  
The attorneys in the sample were predominantly male (78%) 
and white (75%). There were 16 African American attorneys, 2 
Asians, 1 Native American, and no Latino attorneys. Years in 
practice ranged from 1 to 41, with a mean of 14.7 years and a 
median of 12 years. Thirteen attorneys had 1 year or less in 
practice. The number of cases handled ranged from 7 to 299, with 
a mean of 48.4 and median of 33. The attorneys in our sample 
attended 48 different law schools, most of them in-state schools.98  
                                                                                                     
 95. While we believe the distinction between solo practitioners and law 
firm members is important, it is also true that the law firms where these 
attorneys worked were almost always quite small—usually less than five, and 
often just two or three. Fifty-two of the law firms consisted of five or fewer 
attorneys. In only six instances the law firm in question consisted of more than 
five attorneys; in only two instances the law firm in question consisted of more 
than ten attorneys.  
 96. For most of these characteristics, our data is close to complete; for other 
variables, such as the attorney’s age, hometown, and prior service as an 
assistant district attorney, our research did not uncover enough data to make 
the variable useful in our analysis. Most of our information has been collected 
electronically, from a combination of public records such as voter registration 
lists and the list of licensed attorneys maintained by the North Carolina State 
Bar, as well as websites maintained by the attorneys themselves. 
 97. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Ralph A. Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, 
Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and Malpractice, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107, 108 (1997) (discussing the notion that mediation is usually most 
appropriate when the parties involved have an interest in maintaining a long-
term relationship).   
 98. The most common law schools attended were Campbell (54), UNC (31), 
and North Carolina Central (28), all of them in-state law schools. Most of the 
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There were 48 attorneys practicing as public defenders, 91 
attorneys practicing privately but solo, and 63 attorneys 
practicing in a private law firm.99 From information provided by 
the North Carolina State Board of Elections, we determined that 
101 attorneys were registered as Democrats, 48 as Republicans, 
35 as unaffiliated, and 1 as Libertarian. From information 
provided by the North Carolina State Bar’s website, a 
surprisingly high number of the attorneys (12%) had been 
disciplined in some way, whether in the form of admonition, 
censure, reprimand, or suspension of license.100 
B. The Raw Materials and the Attorney Tools 
Which of these biographical and system characteristics might 
affect the performance of defense attorneys? We begin by looking 
at the personal background of the attorneys. Unsurprisingly, 
there were no meaningful differences in the performance scores 
among attorneys based on gender or race.101 More interesting, the 
average score appeared at first glance to vary depending on the 
political affiliation of the defense attorney: Democrats produced 
an average score of -.13, Republicans a score of -.05, and 
unaffiliated attorneys registered an average of -.24, while 
attorneys with an unknown political affiliation produced positive 
scores.102 This apparent difference disappeared, however, when 
we used regression analysis to examine the relative importance of 
these personal background factors taken as a whole.103  
                                                                                                     
attorneys attended an in-state law school (135/191, 71%).  
 99. To determine type of practice, we sometimes had to rely on 2012 
information. We were unable to determine type of practice for 11 attorneys. 
 100. We found disciplinary action for 25 of 208 attorneys.  
 101. Our ANOVA analyses for differences in Attorney Index Scores based on 
attorney gender, race, and age all produced insignificant results. For age, p = 
.25; for gender, p = .56; for race, p = .99.  
 102. Our ANOVA analysis for party affiliation showed a significant 
difference, with p = 0.01.  
 103. This ordinary least squares regression, which we called Model 1, took 
Attorney Index Score as the dependent variable. Independent variables were 
age, gender, and dummy variables for race and party affiliation. Model 1 was 
not significant, with p = .366 and R-squared = .06. This model uses attorney-
level data; for a discussion of the use of case-level data, see infra note 117 and 
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Next, we explored factors relating to the “raw materials” 
available to the attorney in a given case: these included the 
average severity of the offense in the attorney’s portfolio of cases 
and the average level of the prior record among the defendants in 
the portfolio. The prosecutors and defense attorneys may treat 
serious crimes and extensive prior records systematically 
differently from lesser cases, which would affect how much 
movement in sentences one might expect from a defense attorney 
in that setting.  
The raw materials variables also include the prosecutorial 
district where the attorney normally worked. The district 
attorney in one location might pursue distinctive policies, such as 
limits on the plea offers that assistant district attorneys are 
allowed to make for particular crimes. Similarly, the judges in 
one district might follow practices that limit the outcomes that 
are realistically available for a defense attorney to pursue, while 
judges in another district might allow the defense to negotiate a 
wider range of outcomes.  
Each of these raw materials variables, standing alone, 
appears to have a significant effect on the attorney performance 
score.104 When we add these variables to the regression model 
(controlling for the effects of any personal background variables), 
three of them make a significant difference on the performance 
score.105 These include the offender’s prior record,106 the 
                                                                                                     
accompanying text.  
 104. For the ANOVA analyses of the differences in attorney performance 
scores among different offense levels, different offender prior record categories, 
and different prosecutorial districts, p = .000 in all three cases.  
 105. Model 2 retains all the variables from Model 1, and adds new 
independent variables: average offense class, average prior record category, and 
dummy variables for each of the prosecutorial districts, using District 5 as the 
reference category. The model is significant (p = .000) with an R-square statistic 
of .61 and an adjusted R-square of .55.  
 106. The offense level does not correlate with movement in the performance 
score at a significant level. Although offense seriousness intuitively would affect 
attorney performance, the score in our rating system is itself designed to 
account for the offense as charged. On the other hand, the score itself may not 
incorporate the full impact of the offender’s prior record. Even though the value 
added reflects a starting point that accounts for the offender’s prior record, our 
comparison to other attorneys considers all cases in the state with the same 
charged offense, regardless of prior record level. 
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attorney’s age, and the presence of the attorney in the most 
distinctive prosecutorial district.107  
Finally, we turn to those features of the attorney’s 
professional background and practice environment that might 
affect performance outcomes. One might consider these the 
“tools” that the attorney brings to bear on the raw materials that 
present themselves.108  
One of those tools involves the type of office where the 
attorney works: public defender office, solo private practice, or 
private law firm.109 At first glance, there seem to be small 
differences among these practice settings. The average index 
score for public defenders was -.128; for attorneys in law firms,  
-.066; and for solo practitioners, -.004.110 The interaction of this 
feature with other aspects of the raw materials and the other 
attorney tools deserves further attention.  
Another variable that initially attracted our attention is 
years of experience. Intuitively, it is difficult to know whether 
experience would move the performance score up or down. On the 
one hand, attorneys with more experience might learn from past 
efforts and become more effective over time for their clients.111 On 
                                                                                                     
 107. The attorney’s age correlates with years of experience, so we remove 
the age variable in Model 3. Prosecutorial District 21, which had a significant 
effect on attorney performance, claims the highest trial rate in the state, the 
highest use of the habitual felon law, and other distinctive features.  
 108. We recognize that some of the variables in Model 1, which we 
characterized as “personal background,” could just as easily be treated as “tools” 
for the attorney to use for improved performance. One can easily imagine, for 
instance, that Hispanic attorneys (more likely to be bilingual) could be more 
effective with some clients; similarly, the attorney’s gender might become a 
useful “tool” for certain types of offenses or offenders. Taken in the aggregate, 
any such advantages seem to balance each other out across all offense and 
offender types in our data.  
 109. Because we primarily analyze data at the attorney level for this study, 
we do not include a variable for “retained” versus “appointed” counsel. Attorneys 
in private practice in North Carolina typically represent clients of both types, 
and we make no effort here to categorize a private attorney as principally 
retained or appointed.  
 110. The median scores were -.029 for public defenders, .0086 for solo 
practitioners, and .029 for attorneys in private firms. 
 111. Some quantitative analysis finds such an effect in some locations. See 
Abrams & Yoon, supra note 74, at 1150 (finding that experienced attorneys 
achieve substantially more favorable outcomes for their clients than less 
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the other hand, attorneys might devote less energy to their cases 
after many years on the job and may invest less time in learning 
about any changes in criminal law and practice—particularly for 
complex changes in the law, such as the arrival of sentencing 
guidelines. Similarly, more experienced attorneys may over time 
come to accept local norms about acceptable outcomes and stop 
pressing so hard against that accepted courthouse culture.112 This 
phenomenon might be called the “Sam Rayburn effect,” recalling 
the former Speaker of the House of Representatives’ advice: “If 
you want to get along, go along.” 
The data from North Carolina offers tentative support for the 
latter unhappy story about experience. The average case 
performance score remains positive for the first 5 years in 
practice; the average case performance for almost every 
experience level above that is negative.113 Figure 1 summarizes 
the trend. 
  
                                                                                                     
experienced attorneys).   
 112. Structured sentencing in North Carolina took effect in 1994. Structured 
Sentencing Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A–1340.10–23 (1994). 
 113. In Figure 1, the average index score for the category 0–5 years is based 
on 2393 cases and 45 attorneys; for 6–10 years, 2041 cases and 45 attorneys; for 
11–15 years, 2225 cases and 42 attorneys; for 16–25 years, 1991 cases and 40 
attorneys; and for 26 or more years, 1,847 cases and 42 attorneys.  
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Figure 1: Average Case-Level Performance Scores 
by Attorney Experience Level 
 
This performance difference based on experience of the attorney 
might reflect differences in the raw materials or practice setting 
of attorneys as they spend more years in practice. Again, the 
effect of this variable, after controlling for other influences, 
deserves close attention.  
Finally, we were surprised to note that the attorney’s 
criminal caseload (as measured by the number of sentenced cases 
that the attorney shepherded through the system) and an 
attorney’s past discipline by the state bar for ethics violations did 
not correlate with the attorneys’ average performance scores.114  
We added these attorney tools variables to the attorney 
background and raw materials variables to learn more about the 
relative importance of these factors. Table 3 summarizes the 
results of this regression analysis.  
  
                                                                                                     
 114. The ANOVA for attorney caseload was not significant, with p = .727. It 
was also not significant for attorney discipline, with p = .673. 
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Personal Background     
 Male  .019  .34 .74 
 Caucasian  .003 .05 .96 
    Unaffiliated w/Political Party -.002 -.04 .97 
Raw Materials    
  Offense Class .084 1.53 .13 
 Prior Record .210 3.30 .00 
 Prosecutor District 4  -.023 -.30 .76 
 District 9 .085 1.22 .23 
 District 9A .002  .03 .97 
 District 10 -.022 -.34 .74 
 District 12 .034 .44 .66 
 District 13 .022 .35 .73 
 District 18 .023 .35 .72 
 District 19D -.095 -1.66 .10 
 District 21 -.655 -9.38 .00 
 District 25  -.035 -.50 .62 
 District 26  -.084 -1.51 .13 
 District 27A  .107  1.53 .13 
 District 29B -.070 -1.29 .20 
Attorney Tools    
 Caseload .016 .22 .83 
 Years in Practice -.141 -2.56 .01 
 In-state Law School -.016 -.29 .78 
 Bar Discipline -.031 -.57 .57 
 Public Defender Office -.092 -1.16 .25 
 Solo Practice  .080 1.26 .21 
Constant   -2.73 .01 
R-squared = .66 Adj. R-sqd = .60   
Model significance = .000    
This analysis is interesting both for what seems to matter 
and for what seems not to matter. The attorney’s caseload, a 
history of bar discipline, attendance at an in-state law school, and 
a practice based in a public defender’s office or a solo practice 
were all statistically insignificant.115 On the other hand, years of 
                                                                                                     
 115. Variations on Model 3 produced similar results. The results were 
consistent with those we report here when we included all dummy variables for 
race (with African-American attorneys as the reference category) and for 
political affiliation (treating Democrat as the reference category). When we 
removed all Prosecutor Districts, the defense attorney’s base in a public 
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experience remained significant after controlling for other 
variables. Even though more experienced attorneys tend to 
handle cases with more serious charges and more extensive prior 
criminal history records, they still produce weaker results after 
controlling for those variables. 
Among the raw materials variables, the offender’s prior 
criminal record remained significant in this model, suggesting 
that attorneys who handle repeat felons tend to produce better 
results, all other things being equal. Perhaps these cases receive 
the full attention and efforts of the defense attorney because so 
much incarceration time is at stake; or maybe the prosecutors 
and high-volume defense attorneys in the state have reached a 
consensus that the sentencing grid assigns too much weight to 
prior record.  
Finally, two of the prosecutorial districts produced distinctive 
results. Defense attorneys in Districts 21 and 19D tended to 
achieve less sentencing movement than attorneys in the 
comparison district.116 Other prosecutorial districts came close to 
significance in this model.117  
The impact of these two prosecutorial districts flags an 
important limitation of this demonstration project. Our efforts to 
explain sentences (primarily negotiated outcomes) focus on a few 
features of the offense and the offender, along with a larger array 
of factors relating to the defense attorney’s background, abilities, 
and resources. We have little information, however, on the 
professional background and resources of the other negotiating 
partner: the prosecutor. A defender’s office that maintained 
                                                                                                     
defender’s office became significant (p = .03), but we believe this reflects that 
fact that public defender offices are located in only 8 of the 16 districts, and face 
distinctive prosecutor policies.  
 116. We treated Prosecutorial District 5 as the reference category for all of 
the district dummy variables.  
 117. We obtained similar but not identical results with a regression based on 
case-level data rather than attorney-level data. Because the case-level model 
uses an enormous number of records (n = 10,645), it produced significant results 
for the model as a whole, but an extremely low R-squared statistic (.03). In the 
case-level model, offense level proved to be a significant independent variable—
it was reasonably close to significant in the attorney-level Model 3. The presence 
of the case in Prosecutor District 21 also showed up as a significant variable in 
this model.  
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biographical data about individual prosecutors in the district and 
accounted for structural features of the local prosecutor’s office 
might be able to explain more of the performance of defense 
attorneys in single cases or across their entire portfolio of cases. 
An understanding of defense attorney success requires a detailed 
knowledge of prosecutors.  
VI. The Uses and Users of Performance Scores 
Based on this exercise with felony case data from the North 
Carolina courts, we conclude that it is possible to build a 
quantitative rating system for attorneys based on outcomes 
achieved for clients. These performance scores could become one 
component of an attorney evaluation. We now consider several 
responsible—and irresponsible—uses of performance scores, both 
by managers within defender organizations and by outsiders to 
those organizations. 
A. Insider Uses 
A wise manager of a defense attorney organization could use 
performance scores, together with other evaluation techniques, to 
improve the quality of services for clients and to get the most out 
of a limited budget. At the same time, a word of caution is in 
order. Quantitative measures of performance do tell us 
something, but it is important not to become mesmerized by the 
numbers. In the educational context, the evaluation of teachers 
based simply on annual movements in student test scores would 
be misleading. A school principal must combine test score 
information with personal observation of teachers in the 
classroom, review of lesson plans, and regular interaction with 
students and parents to get a realistic evaluation of the 
teacher.118 Relying too heavily on student test scores would be a 
destructive short cut.119  
                                                                                                     
 118. See Zorn, supra note 47 (arguing that a more comprehensive approach 
is needed to evaluate teachers rather than simply considering test scores). 
 119. See id. (noting that the National Academy of Sciences has twice spoken 
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The same is true for defense counsel and sentencing 
outcomes. The scores reveal something important about an 
attorney’s effectiveness, but they cannot stand alone. Given the 
limited information that courts and defender organizations collect 
about any given case, a performance score based on an 
appropriately large number of cases tells the reader something 
about the attorney’s entire portfolio, but not about the quality of 
the lawyer’s work in any single case (or even in a small subset of 
cases). A manager of defense attorneys, like a school principal, 
must combine performance scores with personal observation, in-
depth review of files in selected areas, and interaction with 
clients, judges, and prosecutors to get the full picture of an 
attorney’s work.  
Working within these limits, what personnel and operational 
decisions might benefit from the use of performance scores as one 
input? As we mentioned earlier, a manager could rely on regular 
reports of performance scores to identify attorneys who need 
closer monitoring. If that closer look seems to confirm the 
attorney’s relatively weak performance score, some targeted 
training may be the next step. Weak performance scores might 
also point to a particular category of offense or offender that 
creates extra trouble for the attorney. The scores, combined with 
closer monitoring, could tell the manager the precise type of 
training that might be necessary. Again, if closer observation 
confirms the initial clues from the low performance scores, this 
insight might lead a manager to assign an attorney cases that 
play to his or her strengths.  
Looking beyond the scores assigned to particular attorneys, a 
supervisor making case assignment decisions might draw insight 
from statistical analyses of raw materials and attorney tools. If 
studies of local conditions show that certain types of defense 
attorneys tend to get better results when they negotiate against 
certain types of prosecutors (say, younger defenders with local 
ties working across the table from younger prosecutors with local 
ties), then the supervisor making case assignments might try to 
benefit from this match-up. Much as a baseball manager knows 
                                                                                                     
out about the dangers of basing decisions on erratic and inherently unreliable 
test scores filtered through imperfect and abstruse formulae). 
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which hitters on the bench have the best history against side-
armed, left-handed relief pitchers, a supervisor in a defender 
organization should have more than intuition or anecdotal 
memory to inform her case assignment choices.  
We also indicated in Part IV that a rating system could 
produce reports that focus on the combined outcomes that all 
attorneys in the office achieve, when compared to other attorneys 
in the state, for designated offense types. Where the office 
consistently performs above average, a manager might inquire 
more closely to learn more about what works well. For crimes 
where the entire office lags behind other defense attorneys in the 
state, the report could lead to closer inspection and reflection in 
the office. Perhaps the best response involves a shift of office 
resources from lower priority areas; perhaps more intensive 
training is the answer.  
Performance ratings based on statewide data could also 
identify other regions where the defense bar obtains better 
results for a particular crime. A manager might explore the 
possible reasons for success in those other districts and then aim 
to replicate that success at home. If the defense success turns on 
conditions external to the defender organization itself (for 
instance, judicial practices might be the cause), the leadership of 
the defender organization could start lobbying other institutional 
actors for changes in their local practices.  
Performance scores might also affect the hiring and 
compensation policies of a defender office. For instance, if an 
analysis of the attorney scores shows that attorneys with 
something between five and ten years of experience get the best 
results, all other things being equal, then the hiring strategy for 
the office might prioritize attorneys in that zone. If attorneys 
with more than twenty years of experience tend to produce 
weaker results, then the salary structure in the office might put 
less of a premium on experience. 
B. Outsider Uses 
While we see a wide range of possible uses for performance 
scores among managers and others working inside defender 
organizations, we close with a more skeptical take on the use of 
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these scores by other constituencies. The possibility of 
misinterpretation and misuse of the ratings by judges or potential 
clients is intolerably high. Those actors cannot follow up an 
initial numerical warning system with a more thorough 
individual evaluation. 
Consider first a judge who might use performance scores. 
Suppose that the question of attorney competence arises during 
the adjudication of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. One 
could imagine that an attorney’s low scores in a performance 
rating system might qualify as relevant evidence for the 
petitioner; alternatively, the respondent might want to introduce 
evidence of the attorney’s high scores to show that the attorney 
was generally effective. 
Such judicial uses of a performance score would be 
misguided. The score tells us something about the results an 
attorney achieved in the past, compared to the results that other 
attorneys achieve in cases with at least some common 
characteristics. A score based on more prior cases increases our 
confidence that it was based on a normal distribution of cases, 
and that the unseen features of the attorney’s cases balance each 
other out, for positive and for negative. In short, the score sheds 
light on the attorney’s performance in an entire portfolio of cases. 
For many of the same reasons that rules of evidence severely 
restrict the use of prior similar acts to prove that a person 
committed a particular action, judges should resist the use of an 
attorney’s portfolio performance score to prove that the attorney 
performed especially poorly (or well) in a particular case.  
Similarly, one can imagine that a criminal defendant would 
want to consult attorney performance scores before hiring a 
lawyer. The score, however, would mislead potential clients 
because the assumption of random case distribution might not 
hold true for a given attorney score. The manager of a defender 
organization can account for this possibility by supplementing the 
performance score with other forms of monitoring, including 
personal observation, consultation with other observers of the 
attorney, and closer inspection of case documents. Potential 
clients do not have access to these alternative measures. For 
many of the same reasons that publication of teacher ratings 
based exclusively on student test performance tends to do more 
harm than good, we believe that publication of attorney 
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performance scores would not serve potential clients well. 
Although prospective clients have the most at stake in evaluating 
defense attorneys, they are also most likely to misunderstand 
ratings.  
VII. Conclusion 
The results-based measure of attorney effectiveness that we 
have constructed as a thought experiment for this Article could 
become something more than an academic exercise. It meets a 
widespread need in the field. When combined with other forms of 
observation and assessment, performance scores could enable 
defender organizations to improve their hiring, case assignment, 
compensation structures, and training to deliver better results for 
criminal defendants. Attorney ratings could become a common 
managerial tool among public defender organizations, or even in 
private law firms that specialize in criminal defense.  
The ratings system we built here uses data currently 
available in many state court systems; it does not require an 
expensive layer of personnel to track the essential information 
about each case. The concept is flexible enough to adapt to local 
conditions, including the data available in the jurisdiction, and to 
place value on the aspects of attorney performance that the 
organization’s leaders want to measure. While an office might 
build a better rating system by tracking more detailed case 
information, managers could gain some insight from a bare-bones 
system that tracks the amount of sentence movement in each 
case.  
In the end, the barriers to the use of attorney ratings are 
cultural rather than technical or budgetary. While there are some 
defender organizations that use quantitative measures to track 
the activities of their attorneys collectively,120 these managerial 
                                                                                                     
 120. See Interview with John Gross, Indigent Defense Counsel, Nat’l Ass’n 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, at the Washington & Lee University School of 
Law Symposium: Gideon At 50: Reassessing the Right to Counsel (Nov. 9, 2012) 
(stating that defender organizations have begun to use performance 
evaluations—collective and individual—with a quantitative aspect in Virginia, 
Massachusetts, Texas, and San Mateo County, California). 
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habits cut against the grain. Defense organizations have a 
reputation for attracting people who are skeptical of hierarchy. 
Defender office leaders may very well reject a rating system that 
takes current prosecutor charging as a legitimate starting point 
for measuring attorney performance.  
The legacy of Gideon—a world of thin resources to provide 
defense counsel across a wide swath of criminal defendants—
might overpower these cultural barriers. With so many client 
needs and so few lawyers to meet them, managers could see 
immediate benefits from using performance measures to get more 
value out of limited budgets. Bureaucratic rationality may prove 
hard to resist, even in this corner of the world.  
  
